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Abstract
We propose a new, complementary approach to interpretability, in which machines
are not considered as experts whose role it is to suggest what should be done and
why, but rather as advisers. The objective of these models is to communicate to
a human decision-maker not what to decide but how to decide. In this way, we
propose that machine learning pipelines will be more readily adopted, since they
allow a decision-maker to retain agency. Specifically, we develop a framework for
learning representations by humans, for humans, in which we learn representations
of inputs (‘advice’) that are effective for human decision-making. Representation-
generating models are trained with humans-in-the-loop, implicitly incorporating
the human decision-making model. We show that optimizing for human decision-
making rather than accuracy is effective in promoting good decisions in various
classification tasks while inherently maintaining a sense of interpretability.
1 Introduction
Across many important domains, machine learning algorithms have become unparalleled in their
predictive capabilities. The accuracy and consistency of these algorithms has made them highly
appealing as tools for supporting human decision-making [22, 46]. However, these criteria are far
from comprehensive [49, 5]. Our continued reliance on humans as the final arbiters of these decisions
suggests an awareness that incorporating higher-level concepts, such as risk aversion, safety, or
justification, requires the exercise of human reasoning, planning, and judgment.
The field of interpretable machine learning has developed as one answer to these issues. A common
view of interpretable ML is that it provides explanations [41], thereby allowing integration into the
human reasoning process, and verification as to whether or not auxiliary criteria are being met. Under
this framework, the algorithm is an expert whose task is to suggest what should be done, and, from
its own perspective, why. The human role is reduced to that of quality control: should the algorithm’s
work be accepted or rejected? This role of ‘computer as expert’ undermines a decision-maker’s
sense of agency and generates information that is difficult to integrate with existing intuition. Hence,
users may be reluctant to accept algorithmic suggestions or even inclined to go against them [8, 68],
especially after seeing the algorithm make errors, which can lead to a degradation in performance over
time [20, 15, 43, 47]. In any system in which humans make the final decisions, even highly-accurate
machine outputs are only useful if and when humans make appropriate use of them; c.f. the use of
risk assessment tools in the context of sentencing [60].
∗Equal contribution, alphabetical order.
Preprint. Under review.
ar
X
iv
:1
90
5.
12
68
6v
1 
 [c
s.L
G]
  2
9 M
ay
 20
19
Figure 1: Examples of visualized advice for various inputs: word highlighting for text data, cus-
tomized plots for embedded data, and computerized avatars for structured data. Instead of explaining
algorithmic predictions, we learn representations that directly aid in human decision-making.
Fortunately, advice that conveys how to decide (rather than what) can often be of great value [13].
Advice of this form can be designed to augment the capabilities of human decision makers, rather
than replace them, which many see as a more socially-optimal role for AI [40, 21, 39, 30]. This
can be achieved, for example, by highlighting certain aspects of the problem, providing additional
information, presenting tradeoffs in risks and returns, or outlining possible courses of action. There is
ample empirical evidence suggesting that informative advice can, by acknowledging the central role
decision makers play, both enhance performance and retain agency [31, 34].
Motivated by the above, we advocate for a broader perspective on how machine learning can be used
to support decision-making. Our work builds on a well-known observation in the social sciences,
which is that the performance of humans on decision tasks depends on how problems are presented
or framed [61, 12, 24, 11, 32, 9] To leverage this idea, we shift the algorithmic focus from learning to
predict to learning to represent, and seek representations of inputs (‘advice’) that will lead to good
decisions and thus good outcomes when presented to a human decision maker. Our framework is
designed to use machine learning in a way that preserves autonomy and agency, and in this way
builds trust— crucial aspects of decision-making that are easy to overlook [3, 4, 16, 43].
To successfully reframe difficult problems, we harness the main engine driving deep learning— the
ability to learn useful representations. Just as deep neural networks learn representations under which
classifiers predict well, we learn representations under which human decision makers perform well.
Our model includes three main components: a “truncated” neural network that maps inputs into vector
representations, a visualization module that maps vector representations into visual representations,
and a human decision maker. Our main innovation is a human-in-the-loop training procedure that
seeks to directly optimize human decision outcomes, thus promoting both accuracy and agency.
We demonstrate the approach on three experimental tasks, represented in Figure 1, that cover different
types of decisions and different forms of computational advice, and in problems with increasing
complexity. Both training and evaluation are done with the aid of real human subjects, which we argue
is essential for learning credible human-supportive tools. Our results show that we can iteratively
learn representations that lead to high human accuracy while not explicitly presenting a recommended
action, providing users with means to reason about decisions. Together, these results demonstrate how
deep learning can serve as an instrumental tool for human intelligence augmentation [40, 21, 39, 30].
1.1 Related Work
Interpretability as decision support. There are several ways in which interpretability can be used to
support decision-making. In general, interpretability can help in evaluating criteria that are important
for decisions but hard to quantify, fairness or safety for example, and hence hard to optimize [17].
Many methods do this by producing simplified [1, 37] or augmented [54, 59, 38] versions of the input
that aids users in understanding if the data is used in ways that align with their goals or not. While
some methods exist for systematically iterating over models [56, 36], these give no guarantees as to
whether models actually improve with respect to user criteria. Virtually all works in interpretability
focus on predictive algorithms. Our work differs in that the focus is directed at the human-decision
maker, directly optimizing for better decisions by learning useful human-centric representations.
Incorporating human feedback. Our use of human-in-the-loop methods is reminiscent of work in
active learning, in that humans supply labels to reduce machine uncertainty [58], and in preference-
based reinforcement learning in that we implicitly encode human preferences in our evaluation [67].
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However, in our work, learning a model that approximates human policy decisions is not the end
goal but rather a tool to improve decisions by approximating ‘decision gradients’. While this can be
viewed as a form of black-box gradient estimation [27], current methods assume either inexpensive
queries, noise-free gradients, or both, making them inadequate for modeling human responses.
Expertise, trust, and agency. Recent studies have shown that links between trust, accuracy, and
explainability are quite nuanced [69, 52, 25]. Users fail to consistently increase trust when model
accuracy is superior to human accuracy and when models are more interpretable. Expertise has
been identified as a potentially confounding factor [43], when human experts wrongly believe they
are better than machines, or when they cannot incorporate domain-specific knowledge within the
data-driven model estimate. Agency has also been shown to affect the rate at which people accept
model predictions [16], supporting the hypothesis that active participation increases satisfaction, and
that users value the ability to intervene when they perceive the model as incorrect.
2 Learning Decision-Optimal Representations
2.1 Preliminaries
We consider a setting where users are given instances x ∈ X sampled from some distribution D, for
which they must decide on an action a ∈ A. For example, if x are details of a loan application, then
users can choose a ∈ {approve, deny}. We denote by h the human mapping from arbitrary inputs to
decisions or actions (we use these terms interchangeably). We assume that users are seeking to choose
a = h(x) to minimize an incurred loss `(x, a), and our goal is to aid them in this task. To achieve
this, we can present users with machine-generated advice γ(x), which we think of as a human-centric
‘representation’ of the input. To encourage better outcomes, we seek to learn the representation γ
under which human decisions a = h(γ(x)) entail low expected loss L(γ) = ED[`(x, h(γ(x)))].
We will focus on tasks where actions are directly evaluated against some ground truth y ∈ Y
associated with x and given at train time, and so the loss is of the form `(y, h(γ(x))). In this way,
we cover a large class of important decision problems called prediction policy problems, where the
difficulty in decision-making is governed by a predictive component [35]. For example, the loss from
making a loan depends on whether or not a person will return a given loan, and thus on being able to
make this conditional prediction with good accuracy. This setting is simpler to evaluate empirically,
and allows for a natural comparison to interpretable predictive approaches where γ(x) includes a
machine prediction y˜ and some form of an explanation. In our experiments we have Y = {1, . . . , C},
and denote by ∆C the C-dimensional simplex (allowing probabilistic machine prediction y˜ ∈ ∆C).
Given a train set S = {(xi, yi)}mi=1, we will be interested in minimizing the empirical loss:
min
γ∈Γ
m∑
i=1
`(yi, ai) + λR(γ), ai = h(γ(xi)) (1)
where Γ is the advice class, R is a regularization term that can be task-specific and data-dependent,
and λ is the regularization parameter. The main difficulty in solving Eq. (1) is that {a}mi=1 are actual
human decisions that depend on the optimized function γ via an unknown decision mechanism h.
We first describe our choice of Γ and propose an appropriate regularization R, and then present our
method for solving Eq. (1).
2.2 Learning human-facing representations
Deep neural networks can be conceptualized as powerful tools for learning representations under
which simple predictors (i.e., linear) perform well [6]. By analogy, we leverage neural architectures
for learning representations under which humans perform well. Consider a multi-layered neural
network N (x). Splitting the network at some layer partitions it into a parameterized representation
mapping φθ : Rd → Rk and a predictor f : Rk → ∆C such that N (x) = f(φθ(x)). If we assume
for simplicity that f is fixed, then learning is focused on φ. The challenge is that optimizing θ may
improve the predictive performance of the algorithm, but may not facilitate good human decision-
making. To support human decision makers, our key proposal is to remove f and instead plug in the
human decision function h, therefore leveraging the optimization of θ to directly improve human
performance. We refer to this optimization framework as “M◦M”, Man Composed with Machine,
pronounced “mom” and illustrated in Fig. 2 (left).
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Figure 2: Left: The M◦M framework. The network learns a mapping φ from inputs x to represen-
tations z, such that when z is visualized through the visualization component ρ, the representation
elicits good human decisions a. Right: The learning process. Users are queried for decisions on the
current representations (A). These decisions are used to train a proxy network hˆ (B), that is then used
to re-train representations (C). This process is repeated until convergence.
We also need to be precise about the way a human would perceive the output of φ. The outputs of φ
are vectors z = φθ(x) ∈ Rk, and not likely to be helpful as human input. To make representations
accessible to human users, we add a visualization component ρ : Rk → V , mapping vector repre-
sentations into meaningful visual representations v = ρ(z) in some class of visual objects V (e.g,
scatter-plots, word lists, avatars). Choosing a proper visualization is crucial to the success of our
approach, and should be chosen with care to utilize human cognition (and this is in itself a research
question). Combined, these mappings provide what we mean by the ‘algorithmic advice’:
γ(x) = ρ(φθ(x)) (2)
In the remainder of the paper, we assume that the visualization component ρ is fixed, and focus on
optimizing the advice by learning the mapping φθ. It will be convenient to fold ρ into h, using the
notation h(ρ)(z) = h(ρ(z)). Eq. (1) can now be rewritten as:
min
θ∈Θ
m∑
i=1
`(yi, ai) + λR(θ), ai = h
(ρ)(φθ(xi)) (3)
By solving Eq. (3), we hope to learn a representation of inputs such that, when visualized, promote
good decisions. In the remainder of the paper we will simply use h to mean h(ρ)(z).
2.3 Optimization
The difficulty in optimizing Eq. (3) is that gradients of θ must pass through h. But these are actual
human decisions! To handle this, we propose to replace h(ρ) with a differentiable proxy hˆη : Rk → Y
parameterized by η ∈ H (we refer to this proxy as “h-hat"). A naïve approach would be to train hˆ to
mimic how h operates on inputs z, and use it in Eq. (3). This, however, introduces two difficulties.
First, it is not clear what data should be used to fit hˆ. To guarantee good generalization, hˆ should be
trained on the distribution of z induced by the learned φθ(x), but the final choice of θ depends on hˆ
itself. Second, precisely modeling h can be highly unrealistic (i.e., due to human prior knowledge,
external information, or unknown considerations).
To circumvent these issues, we propose a human-in-the-loop training proce-
dure alternating between fitting hˆη for a fixed θ and training φθ for a fixed hˆη.
Algorithm 1 Alternating optimization algorithm
1: Initialize θ = θ0
2: repeat
3: x1, . . . , xn ∼ S . Sample n train examples
4: zi ← φθ(xi) ∀ i ∈ [n] . Generate representations
5: ai ← h(ρ(zi)) ∀ i ∈ [n] . Query human decisions
6: S′ = {(zi, ai)}ni=1
7: η ← argminη ES′ [`(a, hˆη(z))] . Train hˆ
8: θ ← argminθ′ ES [`(y, hˆη(φθ′ (x)))] . Train φ
9: until convergence
Fig. 2 (right) illustrates this process, and pseu-
docode is given in Algorithm 1. The process be-
gins by generating representations zi = φθ0(xi)
for n ≤ m random training inputs xi with an
initial θ0, and obtaining decisions ai for each
zi generated in this way by querying human
participants. Next, we take these representation-
decision pairs and create an auxiliary sample
set S ′ = {(zi, ai)}ni=1, which we use to fit the
human model hˆη by optimizing η. Fixing η, we
then train φθ by optimizing θ on the empirical
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Figure 3: Visualization of 2D projection task. Points in their original 3D representation give
little visual indication of class (X or O). The initial 2D projection (round 1), set to the final layer
representation of a fully accurate machine-only model, is similarly unintelligible to humans. However,
as training progresses, feedback from human decisions improves the learned 2D projection until the
class becomes visually apparent (round 5), achieving 100% human accuracy.
loss of the original sample set S. We repeat this alternating process until re-training hˆ does not
improve results. In our experiments, both φ and hˆ are implemented through neural networks. In
the Appendix, we discuss practical issues regarding initialization, convergence, early stopping, and
working with human inputs.
The initial training of hˆ makes it match h as best as possible on the distribution of z induced by θ0.
In the next step, however, optimizing θ causes the distribution of z to drift. As a result, forward
passes push out-of-distribution samples into hˆ, and hˆ may no longer be representative of h (and
with no indication of failure). Fortunately, this discrepancy is corrected at the next iteration, when
hˆ is re-trained on fresh human-annotated samples drawn from the distribution induced by the new
parameters θ. In this sense, our training procedure literally includes humans-in-the-loop.
In order for performance to improve, it suffices that hˆ induces gradients of the loss that approximate
those of h. This is a weaker condition than requiring hˆ to match h exactly. In the Appendix we show
how even simple hˆ models that do not fit h well are still effective in the overall training process.
3 Experiments
We conduct a series of experiments on data-based decision-making tasks of increasing complexity.
Each task uses the general algorithmic framework presented with a different, task-appropriate class
of advice representations. Each experiment is also successively more sophisticated in the extent of
human experimentation that is entailed. The appendix includes further details on each experiment.
3.1 Decision-compatible 2D projections
High-dimensional data is notoriously difficult for humans to handle. One way to make it accessible
is to project points down to a low dimension where they can be visualized (e.g., with plots). But
neither standard dimensionality reduction methods nor the representation layer of neural networks
are designed to produce visualizations that support human decision-making. PCA, for example,
optimizes a statistical criterion that is agnostic to how humans visually interpret its output.
Our M◦M framework suggests to learn an embedding that directly supports good decisions. We
demonstrate this in a simple setting where the goal of users is to classify d-dimensional point clouds,
where d > 2. Let V be a linear 2D subspace of Rd. Each point cloud is constructed such that, when
orthogonally projected onto V , it forms one of two visual shapes— an ‘X’ or an ‘O’ —that determine
its label. All other orthogonal directions contain similarly scaled random noise. We use M◦M to train
an orthogonal 2D projection (φ) that produces visual scatter-plots (ρ). Here, φ is a 3x3 linear model
augmented with an orthogonality penalty φTφ− I, and hˆ is a small single-layer 3x3 convolutional
network that takes as inputs a soft (differentiable) 6x6 histogram over the 2D projections.
In each task instance, users are presented with a 2D visualization of a point cloud and must determine
its shape (i.e., label). Our goal is to learn a projection under which point clouds can be classified by
humans accurately, immediately, and effortlessly. Initially, this is difficult, but as training progresses,
user performance feedback gradually “rotates” the projection, revealing class shapes (see Fig. 3).
Importantly, users are never given machine-generated predictions. Rather, progress is driven solely
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Figure 4: Examples of word sets selected by M◦M and by LIME. Color indicates machine-perceived
sentiment (green for positive, red for negative). The explanation generated by LIME includes many
words with no intuitive sentiment (e.g., ‘movie’). While LIME can be useful for identifying words
that may not be desirable as predictive features (e.g., ‘female’), M◦M works in a different way, by
directly adjusting itself to how humans make decisions.
by the performance of users on algorithmically “reframed” problem instances (i.e., projections),
achieving 100% human accuracy in only 5 training rounds with at most 20 queries each.
3.2 Decision-compatible feature selection
In some applications, inputs are composed of many discrete elements, such as words or sentences in
a document, or objects in an image. A useful form of advice in this setting is to ‘summarize’ inputs
by highlighting a small subset of important elements or features. Consider, for example, a task of
determining text sentiment, where the summary would be relevant words. The M◦M framework
suggests that models should be trained to choose summaries (representations) that are effective in
helping humans make good decisions.
In this section, we consider the task of determining text sentiment using the IMDB Movie Review
Dataset [44]. We compare M◦M with the LIME [54] method, which learns a post hoc summarization
to best explain the predictions of black-box predictive models. LIME chooses a subset of words for
an input x by training a simpler model to match the black-box prediction in the neighborhood of x.
The summarization selected by LIME may therefore give insight to the model’s internal workings,
but seems only likely to build trust to the extent that the “explanation” matches human intuition. And
when it does not, the advice offered by LIME is unlikely to help users to form their own opinion.
In our experiment, we implement a subset-selection mechanism in φ as a Pointer Network [65], a
neural architecture that is useful in learning mappings from sets to subsets. In particular, we model φ
as a pair of “dueling” Pointer Network advisers, one for ‘positive sentiment‘ and one for ‘negative
sentiment‘. The learning objective is designed to encourage each adviser to give useful advice by
competing for the user’s attention, with the idea of giving the user a balanced list of “good reasons”
for choosing the each of the possible alternatives (see Appendix for details). The visualizer ρ simply
presents the chosen words to the user, and the goal of users is to determine the sentiment of the
original text from its summary. In this experiment we trained using simulated human responses via
queries to a word sentiment lexicon, which proved to be cost effective, but as in all other experiments,
evaluation was done with real humans. For LIME we use a random forest black-box predictor and a
linear ‘explainable’ model, as in the original LIME paper.
Results. The black-box random forest classifier is fairly accurate, achieving 78% accuracy on
the test set when trained and evaluated on full text reviews. However, when LIME summaries
composed of the top and bottom three words with highest coefficients were given as input to humans,
their performance was only 65%. Meanwhile, when given summaries generated by M◦M, human
performance reached 76%, which almost matches machine performance but using summaries alone.
Examples of summaries generated by M◦M and LIME are given in Figure 4.
M◦M creates summaries that are more diverse and nuanced; LIME uses half the number of overall
unique words, five of which account for 20% of all word appearances. Words chosen by LIME do
not necessarily convey any sentiment— for instance, the word ‘movie’ is LIME’s most frequent
indication of negative sentiment (7.4%), and the word ‘female’ is chosen to convey negative sentiment.
This artifact may be helpful in revealing spurious correlations used by the black-box algorithm to
achieve high accuracy, but is uninformative as input as input to a human decision maker.
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Figure 5: Right: different learned avatars conveying algorithmic advice through facial expressions
(see Appendix for more examples). Left: Human accuracy in the algorithmic advice condition (‘avatar
advice’) consistently increases over rounds. Performance quickly surpasses the ‘data only’ condition,
and steadily approaches performance of users observing algorithmic predictions (‘predictive advice’),
which in itself is lower than machine-only performance. When faces are shuffled within predicted
labels of hˆ, accuracy falls, suggesting that faces convey important multi-variate information.
3.3 Decision-compatible algorithmic avatars
Our main experiment focuses on the problem of approving loans using the Lending Club dataset.2
Given details of a loan application, the task of a decision maker is to decide whether to approve the
loan or not. This can be done by first predicting the conditional outcome of giving a loan, and then
determining an appropriate course of action. Predicting accurately is important but not sufficient, as in
reality, decision makers must also justify their decisions. Our goal in this task is twofold: aid decision
makers in making good decisions, and provide them with means to reason about their choices.
The standard algorithmic approach to assisting users would be to give them predictions or risk scores,
perhaps along with an ‘explanation’. This, however, reduces the rich data about an application to a
single number. Instead, we propose to give a decision maker ‘just right’ high-dimensional advice—
compressed enough to be managable, yet rich enough to preserve multi-variate aspects of the input
—crucial for retaining users’ ability to reason about their decisions [51].
For this task, we augment inputs with algorithmic advice in the form of an ‘avatar’ framed as
conveying through its facial expression information that is relevant to the conditional outcome of
giving a loan. Facial expressions have been used successfully to represent and augment multivariate
data [57, 63, 10], but by manually mapping features to facial components (whereas we learn this
mapping). We use realistic-looking faces, with the goal of harnessing innate human cognitive
capabilities— immediate, effortless, and fairly consistent processing of facial signals [26, 33, 62, 23]
—to successfully convey complex high-dimensional information (see Fig. 5 and Appendix for details).
Setup. We split the data 80:20 into a train set and a held-out test set, which is only used for the
final evaluation. To properly assess human decisions we include only loans for which we know the
resolution in the data (either repay in full or default), and accordingly set `(y, a) = 1{y=a} where
y ∈ {0, 1} indicates the ground truth (1 = repay, 0 = default), and a ∈ {0, 1} indicates the decision
(1 = approve, 0 = deny). Following M◦M we use the train set to optimize the representation φ, and
at each round, use the outputs of φ (parametrizations of faces) to fit hˆ using real human decisions
(i.e., approve or deny) gathered from mTurk.3 We set φ and hˆ to be small fully connected networks
with 1 25-hidden unit layer and 2 20-hidden unit layers, respectively. The visualizing unit ρ turns
the vectorized outputs of φ into avatars by morphing seven ‘facial dimensions’ from various sources
[18, 62] using the Webmorph software [14]. To prevent mode collapse, wherein faces “binarize" to
two prototypical exemplars, we add a reconstruction regularization term R(x) = ‖x− ψ(φ(x))‖22 to
the objective, where ψ is a decoder implemented by an additional neural network. In the Appendix we
give a detailed description of the learning setup, training procedure, mTurk experimental environment,
and the unique challenges encountered when training with turkers in the loop.
Evaluation. We are interested in evaluating both predictive performance and the capacity of users for
downstream reasoning. We compare between the following conditions: (1) no advice, (2) predictive
advice: γ(x) = y˜ ∈ [0, 1] is a predictive probability by a pre-trained predictive model N (x), (3)
2 https://www.kaggle.com/wendykan/lending-club-loan-data
3All experiments were approved by the Harvard University IRB.
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representational advice: γ(x) = v, where v = ρ(φ(x)) is an avatar, and (4) a ‘shuffled’ condition
which we will soon describe. In all conditions, this advice is given to users in addition to the five
most informative features of each example (given by the regularization path of a LASSO model).
Since users in the experiment are non-experts, and because there is no clear incentive for them not to
follow predictive advice, we expect the predictive advice condition to give an upper bound on human
performance in the experiment; this artifact of the experimental environment should not necessarily
hold in reality. We benchmark results with the accuracy of N (having architecture equal to hˆ ◦ φ).
Results. Fig. 5 shows the training process and resulting test accuracies4 (the data is fairly balanced so
chance ≈ 0.5). Initially, the learned representation φ produces arbitrary avatars, and performance in
the avatar condition is lower than in the no advice condition. This indicates that users take into account
the (initially uninformative) algorithmic advice. As learning progresses, user feedback accumulates,
and accuracy steadily increases. After six training rounds, accuracy in the avatar condition reaches
94% of the accuracy in the predictive advice condition. Interestingly, performance in the predictive
advice condition does not reach the machine accuracy benchmark, showing that even experimental
subjects do not always follow predictive advice. This resonates well with our arguments from Sec. 1.
In addition to accuracy, our goal is to allow users to reason about their decisions. This is made possible
by the added reconstruction penaltyR, designed to facilitate arguments based on analogical reasoning:
“x will likely be repaid because x is similar to x′, and x′ was repaid” [42, 29]. Reconstruction serves
two purposes. First, it ensures that reasoning in ‘avatar-space’ is anchored to the similarity structure
in input space, therefore encouraging sound inference, as well as promoting fairness through similar
treatment of similar people [70]. Second, reconstruction ensures the high dimensionality of the
avatar advice representation, conveying rich information. To demonstrate the importance of using
high-dimensional advice, we add a condition where avatars are “shuffled” within predicted classes
according to hˆ (i.e., examples with yˆ = 0 and with yˆ = 1 are shuffled separately). Results show a drop
in accuracy, confirming that avatars support decision-making by conveying more than unidimensional
predictive information. Clearly, this cannot be said of scalar predictive advice, and in the Appendix
we show how in this condition reasoning becomes impractical.
In regard to the gap between the avatar and predictive advice conditions, note that (1) R is a penalty
term, and introduces a tradeoff between accuracy and reasoning capacity, and (2) users on mTurk
have nothing at stake and are more likely to follow predictive advice where professionals would not.
4 Discussion
Our paper presents a novel learning framework for supporting human decision-making. Rather than
viewing algorithms as omniscient experts asked to explain their conclusions, we position algorithms
as advisors whose goal is to help humans make better decisions while retaining agency. Our
framework leverages the power of representation learning to find ways to provide advice promoting
good decisions. By tapping into innate cognitive human strengths, learned representations can aid
decision-making by prioritizing information, highlighting alternatives, and correcting biases.
The broader M◦M framework is motivated by the many professional settings, such as health, edu-
cation, justice, and business, in which people make data-dependent decisions. We also believe it
applies to everyday decisions of a personal, social, or financial nature. Without access to professional
decision makers, a challenge we have faced is that we’ve needed to limit our experimental focus to
decision tasks that are governed by a prediction problem. But the framework itself is not limited to
these tasks, and we hope to stimulate further discussion and motivate future research initiatives.
The idea of seeking to optimize for human decisions should not be considered lightly. In our work,
the learning objective was designed to align with and support the goals of users. Ideally, by including
humans directly in the optimization pipeline, we can augment human intelligence as well as facilitate
autonomy, agency, and trust. It is our belief that a responsible and transparent deployment of models
with “h-hat-like” components should encourage environments in which humans are aware of what
information they provide about their thought processes. Unfortunately, this may not always be the
case, and ethical, legal, and societal aspects of systems that are optimized to promote particular
kinds of human decisions must be subject to scrutiny by both researchers and practitioners. Decision
support methods can also be applied in a biased way to induce persuasion [28], and strategies for
4 Results are statistically significant under a one-way ANOVA test, F(3, 97) = 9.8, p < 1e− 5.
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effecting influence that are learned in one realm may be transferable to others [19]. Of course, these
issues of algorithmic influence are not specific to our framework, consider news ranking, social
content promotion, product recommendation, and targeted advertising, for example.
Looking forward, we think there is good reason to be optimistic about the future of algorithmic
decision support. Systems designed specifically to provide users with the information and framing they
need to make good decisions can seek to harness the strengths of both computer pattern recognition
and human judgment and information synthesis. Through this, we can hope that the combination of
man and machine can do better than either one by themselves. The ideas presented in this paper serve
as a step toward this goal.
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Appendix A General Optimization Issues
Initialization. Because acquiring human labels is expensive, it is important to initialize φ to map to a
region of the representation space in which there is variation and consistency in human reports, such
that gradients lead to progress in subsequent rounds. In some representation spaces, such as our 2D
projections of noisy 3D rotated images, this is likely to be the case (almost any 3D slice will retain
some signal from the original 2D image). However, in 4+ dimensions, as well as with the subset
selection and avatar tasks, there are no such guarantees. To minimize non-informative queries, we
adopt two initialization strategies:
1. Initialization with a computer-only model: In scenarios in which the representation space
is a (possibly discrete) subset of input space, such as in subset selection, the initialization
problem is to isolate the region of the input space that is important for decision-making. In
this situation, it can be useful to initialize with a computer-only classifier. This classifier
should share a representation-learning architecture with φ but can have any other classifying
architecture appended (although simpler is likely better for this purpose). This should
result in some φ which at least focuses on the features relevant for classification, if not
necessarily in a human-interpretable format. For an example, see Table 1, which shows how
a machine-initialized Pointer Network selects relevant words but uses an idea of ‘1’(top set)
and ‘0’(bottom set) which is not discernible to human users.
Table 1: Examples of words chosen by the Ptr-Net when initialized with machine
init
pos pos neg
deplorable admirable abomination
marcel clever sullen
gifted nighttime occasion
aroused academia abomination
and by sullen
rumors Gabon said
2. Initialization to a desired distribution with a WGAN: In scenarios in which the initial-
ization problem is to isolate a region of representation space into which to map all inputs, as
in the avatar example, in which we wish to test a variety of expressions without creating
expression combinations which will appear overly strange to participants, it can be useful to
hand-design a starting distribution over representation space and initialize φ with a Wasser-
stein GAN [2]. In this case, we use a Generator Network with the same architecture as φ but
allow the Discriminator Network to be of any effective architecture. As with the previous
example, this results in an φ in which the desired distribution is presented to users, but not
necessarily in a way that reflects any human intuitive concept.
Convergence. As is true in general of gradient descent algorithms, our framework is not guaranteed
to find a global optimum but rather is likely to end up at a local optimum dependent on both the
initialization of φ and hˆ. In our case, however, the path of gradient descent is also dependent on the
inherently stochastic selection and behavior of human users. If users are inconsistent or user groups
at different iterations are not drawn from the same behavior distribution, it is possible that learning at
one step of the algorithm could result in convergence to a suboptimal distribution for future users. It
remains future work to test how robust machine learning methods might be adapted to this situation
to mitigate this issue.
Regularization/Early Stopping As mentioned in Section 2, training φ will in general shift the
distribution of the representation space away from the region on which we have collected labels for hˆ
in the previous iterations, resulting in increasing uncertainty in the predicted outcomes. We test a
variety of methods to account for this, but developing a consistent scheme for choosing how best to
maximize the information in human labels remains future work.
• Regularization of hˆ: We test regularization of hˆ both with Dropout and L2 regularization,
both of which help in preventing overfitting, especially in early stages of training, when the
representation distribution is not yet refined. As training progresses and the distribution
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φθ(x) becomes more tightly defined, decreasing these regularization parameters increases
performance.
• Training hˆ with samples from previous iterations: We also found it helpful in early
training iterations to reuse samples from the previous human labeling round in training hˆ, as
inspired by [7]. We weight these samples equally and use only the previous round, but it
may be reasonable in other applications to alter the weighting scheme and number of rounds
used.
• Early stopping based on Bayesian Linear Regression: In an attempt to quantify how the
prediction uncertainly changes as θ changes, we also implement Bayesian Linear Regression,
found in [55] to be a simple but effective measure of uncertainty, over the last layer of hˆ(φθ)
as we vary θ through training. We find that in early iterations of training, this can be an
effective stopping criterion for training of φ. Again, as training progresses, we find that this
mostly indicates only small changes in model uncertainty.
Human Input. Testing on mTurk presents additional challenges for our application:
• In some applications, such as loan approval, Mturk users are not experts. It is therefore diffi-
cult to convince them that anything is at stake (we found that bonuses did not meaningfully
affect performance), It is also difficult to directly measure effort, agency, trust, or autonomy,
all of which result in higher variance in responses.
• In many other applications, the ground truth is generated by humans to begin with (for
example, sentiment analysis). Since we require ground truth for training, in these task it
cannot be expected of humans to outperform machines.
• As the researchers found in [36], there can be large variance in the time users take to
complete a given task. Researchers have found that around 25% of mTurk users complete
several tasks at once or take breaks during HITs [45], making it difficult to determine how
closely Turkers are paying attention to a given task. We use requirements of HIT approval
rate greater than 98%, US only, and at least 5,000 HITs approved, as well as a simple
comprehension check.
• Turker populations can vary over time and within time periods, again leading to highly
variate responses, which can considerably effect the performance of learning.
• Recently, there have been concerns regarding the usage of automated bots within the mTurk
communiy. Towards this end, we incorporated in the experimental survey a required reading
comprehension task and a captcha task, and filtered users that did not succeed in these.
Appendix B Experimental Details
B.1 Decision-compatible 2D projections
In the experiment, we generate 1000 examples of these point clouds in 3D. The class of φ is a 3x3
linear layer with no bias, where we add a penalization term on φTφ− I during training to constrain
the matrix to be orthogonal. Humans are shown the result of passing the points through this layer and
projecting onto the first two dimensions. The class of hˆ is a small network with 1 3x3 convolutional
layer creating 3 channels, 2x2 max pooling, and a sigmoid over a final linear layer. The input to this
network is a soft (differentiable) 6x6 histogram over the 2D projection shown to the human user.
In an interactive command line query and response game we tested ourselves, φ was consistently
able to find a representation that allowed for 100% accuracy. Many times this was the projection that
appeared to be an ‘x’ and ‘o’ shown in Figure 6, but occasionally it was user-specific. For example, a
user who associates straight lines with the ‘x’ may train the network to learn any projection for ‘x’
that includes many points along a straight line.
The architecture of φ and hˆ are described in Section 3. For training, we use a fixed number of epochs
(500 for hˆ and 300 for φ) with base learning rates of .07 and .03, respectively, that increase with
lower accuracy scores and decrease with each iteration. We have found these parameters to work
well in practice, but observed that results were not sensitive to their selection. The interface allows
the number of rounds and examples to be determined by the user, but generally 100% accuracy can
be achieved after about 5 rounds of 10 examples each.
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(a) Initial (b) Step 3 ‘x’ (c) Step 3 ‘o’ (d) Step 4 ‘x’ (e) Step 4 ‘o’
Figure 6: Images of x-o interface
B.2 Decision-compatible feature selection
The input to our pointer network is a sequence of 100-dimensional GloVe[50] embeddings of words.
The outputs to hˆ are one-hot vectors of the selected words’ GloVe embeddings multiplied by the
softmax probabilities output by the attention mechanism. This allows for differentiable subset
selection. The outputs to the human user are subsets of words.
Here hˆ attempts to replicate the evaluation of the human user on each individual word selected by
mapping the GloVe embedding for the word to the human value for that word. With real humans
in the loops, we would allow this to be -1 (negative sentiment), 0 (neutral sentiment), or 1 (positive
sentiment).
In this experiment, to isolate the performance of the Pointer Network with feedback from hˆ and
because hand-labeling examples without access to a crowd is time-consuming, these evaluations
were made by a simple simulation of how a human might make decisions. In our reference task
of sentiment classification, the simulation assigns positive and negative weights to all words, with
explicitly positive words receiving a weight wp ∼ U [.5, 1], explicitly negative words receiving a
weight wn ∼ U [−1,−.5], and all other neutral words receiving a weight wi ∼ U [−.1, .1]. The
positive and negative weights are fixed for any given word throughout a dataset, so for example
“good" has the same value every time it appears in an example. While this represents a very rough
approximation of human text evaluation, it has the clear benefit of being able to be queried many
times , which allows us to test whether or not the Pointer Network can succeed in combination with
hˆ before proceeding to tests with real human users. Note that while training was performed with
a simulator, evaluation on the test set was done using real human queries and therefore represent
human performance.
Datasets are generated by taking the first 40 alphanumeric non-stop words from the IMDB review
dataset [44] for examples with at least 40 such words.
We additionally use LIME to explain a Random Forest Classifier with 500 estimators and max depth
75 on the bag of words transformation of the dataset.
B.3 Decision-compatible algorithmic avatars
B.3.1 Data Preprocessing
We use the Lending Club dataset, which we filter to include only loans for which we know the
resolution (either default or paid in full, not loans currently in progress) and to remove all features
that would not have been available at funding time. We additionally drop loans that were paid off
in a single lump sum payment of at least 5 times the normal installment. This results in a dataset
that is 49% defaulted and 51% repaid loans. Categorical features are transformed to one-hot dummy
variables. There are roughly 95,000 examples remaining in this dataset, of which we split 20% into
the test set.
B.3.2 Learning architecture and pipeline
The network φ takes as input the standardized loan data. Although the number of output dimension
are R9, φ outputs vectors in R11. This is because the some facial expressions do not naturally coexist
as compound emotions, i.e., happiness and sadness [18]. Hence, we must add some additional
constraints to the output space, encoded in the extra dimensions. For example, happiness and sadness
are split into two separate parameters (rather than using one dimension with positive for happiness
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Figure 7: Visualization of reconstruction component
and negative for sadness). The same is true of “happy surprise", which is only allowed to coincide
with happiness, as opposed to “sad surprise". For parameters which have positive and negative
versions, we use a tanh function as the final nonlinearity, and for parameters which are positive only,
we use a sigmoid function as the final nonlinearity.
These parameters are programmatically mapped to a series of Webmorph [14] transformation text
files, which are manually loaded into the batch transform/batch edit functions of Webmorph. We use
base emotion images from the CFEE database [18] and trait identities from [48]. This forms ρ for
this experiment.
The network φ is initialized with a WGAN to match a distribution of parameters chosen to output
a fairly uniform distribution of feasible faces. To achieve this, each parameter was chosen to be
distributed according to one of the follwowing: a clipped N (0, 4), U [0, 1] , or Beta(1,2). The choice
(a) Loss in training hˆ over 3
rounds
(b) Validation Accuracy in train-
ing φ over 3 rounds
Figure 8: hˆ does not necessarily have to match h well to lead to an increase in accuracy
of distribution was based on inspection as to what would give reasonable coverage over the set of
emotional representations we were interested in testing. In this initial version of φ, x values end up
mapped randomly to representations, as the WGAN has no objective other than distribution matching.
In the first experiment, we collect approximately 5 labels each (with minor variation due to a few
mTurk users dropping out mid-experiment) for the LASSO feature subset of 400 training set x points
and their φ0 mappings (see Figure 10). a is taken to be the percentage of users responding “approve"
for each point.
To train hˆ, we generate 15 different training-test splits of the collected {z, a} pairs and compare
the performance of variations of hˆ in which it is either initialized randomly or with the hˆ from the
previous iteration, trained with or without adding the samples from the previous iteration, and ranging
over different regularization parameters. We choose the training parameters and number of training
epochs which result in the lowest average error across the 15 random splits. In the case of random
initialization, we choose the best out of 30 random seeds over the 15 splits.
To train φ, we fix hˆ and use batches of 30,000 samples per epoch from the training set, which has
75,933 examples in total. In addition to the reconstruction regularization term ‖x− ψ(φ(x))‖22 (see
Figure 7) and the binary cross entropy accuracy loss, φ here also features a constraint penalty that
prevents co-occurrence of incompatible emotions.
We train φ for 2,000 epochs with the Adam optimizer for a variety of values of α, where we use α to
balance reconstruction and accuracy loss in the form Ltotal = αLacc + (1− α)Lrec. We choose the
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value of α per round that optimally retains x information while promoting accuracy by inspecting the
accuracy vs. reconstruction MSE curve. We then perform Bayesian Linear Regression over the final
layer of the current hˆ for every 50th epoch of φ training and select the number of epochs to use by
the minimum of either 2,000 epochs or the epoch at which accuracy uncertainty has doubled. In all
but the first step, this resulted in using 2,000 epochs.
At each of the 2-5th epochs, we choose only 200 training points to query. In the 6th epoch we use
200 points from the test set.
B.4 Results by user type
In the end of the survey, we ask users to report their decision method from among the following
choices:
• I primarily relied on the data available
• I used the available data unless I had a strong feeling about the advice of the computer
system
• I used both the available data and the advice of the computer system equally
• I used the advice of the computer system unless I had a strong feeling about the available
data
• I primarily relied on the advice of the computer system
• Other
The percentage of users in each of these groups varied widely from round to round. We consider the
first two conditions to be the ‘Data’ group, the third to be the ‘Equal’ group, and the next two to be
the ‘Computer Advice’ group. While the groups are too small to draw many conclusions from this
data, we find that users who report only or primarily using the data increase in mean accuracy from
.51 in round 1 to .65 in round 6 (p < .001).
This implies at least one of the following: users misreport their decision method; users believe they
are not influenced by the advice but in fact are; as the algorithmic evidence becomes apparently better,
only the population of users who are comparatively skilled at using the data continue to do so.
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Figure 8: Richness of avatar representation. A visualization of 200 avatars randomly sampled from
the held-out test set, grouped by either human (top) or machine (bottom) predictive probability
(0.2 in blue, 0.8 in orange, with a tolerance of 0.05). Avatars are positioned based on a 1D PCA
dimensionality reduction of their corresponding feature vectors z, along which a ‘gradient’ of facial
changes can be observed. Top: Here avatars are grouped by human predictive probability. The figure
shows how for the same human decisions, learning results in avatars of varied and complex facial
expressions, conveying rich high-dimensional information. Interestingly, avatars corresponding to
loan denial exhibit more variance, suggesting that there may be more ‘reasons’ for denying a loan
than for approving one. Bottom: Here avatars are grouped by machine predictive probability. Since
all examples in each group have the same predictive probability, they are equally similar, which does
not facilitate a clear notion for reasoning. In contrast, avatars maintain richness in variation, and can
be efficiently used for reasoning (e.g., via similarity arguments) and other downstream tasks.
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(a) Training Rounds (b) Test Round
Figure 9: Results by Reported User Type
B.5 Diversity in avatar representation
We believe the additional dimensionality of the avatar representation relative to a numerical or binary
prediction of default is useful for two reasons. Most importantly, high dimensionality allows users to
retain an ability to reason about their decisions. In particular, avatars are useful because people likely
have at least two inherent mental reference points for what they believe to be ‘good’ and ‘bad’ faces.
Moreover, users who have a more sophisticated mental reference space than this either inherently or
because they have undergone training with the algorithm may be able to teach the advising system
to match specific reasoning patterns to specific characteristics over time. Additionally, when the
advising system does not have a strong conviction about a prediction, presenting neutral advice
should encourage the user to revisit the data, whereas percentages above or below the either base rate
of default or 50% may suffer from the anchoring effect [64, 53].
Appendix C Notes on Facial Avatars
We are aware of the many concerning ways in which faces can have been used in AI systems in
discriminatory ways [66]. Ours is not a paper about bias, and we have aimed to minimize these
concerns to the extent possible, e.g., by restricting to variations on the image of a single person. Given
current generative flow model technology, it is feasible that a similar experiment could be conducted
using other abstract out-of-domain representation, such as landscapes, scenes, or even abstract color
splashes generated according to latent parameters. Among these, we chose faces primarily for the
following reasons:
• Humans have some pre-existing, shared representations in facial emotion space. This holds
to a larger extent when for populations of higher homogeneity (i.e., our testing group, which
included only Americans). This is convenient, as with the other representations we would
have had to have workers undergo a training round so that they would have some shared
conception of the representation space.
(a) (b)
Figure 10: Images from mTurk questionnaire
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• Humans are capable of perceiving, processing, and inferring faces at almost effortlessly
and with remarkable speed. Inferences are consistent and, to some extent, universal. This
is made possible due to innate and dedicated neural circuitry for face perception found in
human brains, playing the role of ‘brain GPU’ in our learning framework.
• There are many pre-existing tools for facial morphing and face recognition, which can be
useful as reliable components in the training pipeline.
We emphasize that this is merely a convenient example of a broader space of potential representations
and not an important component of our framework.
Moreover, the expressions of the facial avatar developed here are only intended to be used in the
context of the present system, to provide a suitable representation of the data that is relevant to a
given individual and helps with decision making. The facial avatar is not intended to be used to drive
decision making in other contexts, and indeed, its very generation requires access to a particular set
of covariates for an individual.
Appendix D Select Turker quotes
• “I wasn’t always looking at just happiness or sadness. Sometimes the expressions seemed
disingenuously happy, and that also threw me off. I don’t know if that was intentional but it
definitely effected my gut feeling and how I chose.”
• “In my opinion, the level of happiness or sadness, the degree of a smile or a frown, was used
to represent applications who were likely to be payed back. The more happy one looks, the
better the chances of the client paying the loan off (or at least what the survey information
lead me to believe).”
• “I was more comfortable with facial expressions than numbers. I felt like a computer and I
didn’t feel human anymore. Didn’t like it at all.”
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